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WALKER V. TEXAS-DIVISION, SONS OF CONFEDERATE
VETERANS, INC.: SPECIALTY LICENSE PLATES,
CONFEDERATE FLAGS, AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
EDWARD J. SCHOEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous article1 this author traced the history of the government
speech doctrine from the time it first appeared in a concurring decision in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,2 to
its prominent role in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,3 in which the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the city’s decision to display permanent
monuments in a public park is a form of government speech, which is neither
subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment, nor a form of expression to
which public forum analysis applies. This review demonstrated that the
intersection between government speech and the First Amendment is very
tricky terrain, because of the inherent difficulties in determining what is
government speech, mixed private and government speech, or private speech
in a limited public forum.
These difficulties are vividly demonstrated by the recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Inc.4 In Walker, the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board (“the Board)
denied the application the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Texas Division
(“SCV”), a nonprofit entity, for a specialty license plate containing the
following design:

*

J.D., Professor of Management, Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, Glassboro,
New Jersey.
1
Edward J. Schoen & Joseph S. Falchek, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Government Speech
Takes Center Stage, 20 S. L J. 1 (2010).
2
412 U.S. 94, 139 n. 7 (1973).
3
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
4
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
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Under Texas law, a nonprofit organization seeking to sponsor a
specialty license plate must submit its proposed design to the Board for its
approval. The Board may refuse to create the proposed specialty license plate
for a variety of reasons, one of which is whether the license might be
offensive to any member of the public. The Board denied SCV’s application
for the specialty license plate, because public comments showed many
members of the public were offended by the design and “a significant portion
of the public associate the confederate flag with organizations advocating
expressions of hate directed toward people or groups that is demeaning to
those people or groups.”5
Claiming that its First Amendment rights had been violated and seeking
an injunction requiring the Board to approve its specialty license plate
design, SCV filed suit against the Board in federal district court, which
entered judgment for the Board. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
in a divided panel decision, reversed, deciding that specialty license plates
are private speech and that the Board’s decision constituted viewpoint
discrimination prohibited by the First Amendment.6 In a 5-4 decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, and ruled the issuance of
specialty license plates by Texas was government speech and the Board was
entitled to refuse to approve and issue SCV’s proposed license plate design.7
Because the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Summum played a crucial role
in the analysis of both the majority and the minority opinions, it is likely
helpful to review that decision preliminarily.

5

Id. at 2245.
Id.
7
Id. at 2253.
6
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II. PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM
Pleasant Grove City, Utah, maintains a public park containing about a
dozen, permanent, privately donated displays, including a monument
containing the Ten Commandments. Summum, a religious organization,
petitioned Pleasant Grove City to install a monument containing its religious
principles, the “Seven Aphorisms of Summum,” and Pleasant Grove City
denied the request. Summum filed suit in federal district court, claiming its
First Amendment rights were violated. The district court denied Summum’s
request for a preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed, determining public parks are traditionally regarded as
public forums and the exclusion of Summum’s proposed monument was
unlikely to survive strict scrutiny.8 Deciding Pleasant Grove City was
engaged in government speech when it decided to accept and display
monuments in the public park, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded the First
Amendment was inapplicable and reversed the Tenth Circuit.9
The U.S. Supreme Court preliminarily described the role and
importance of government speech, and explained why the First Amendment
does not regulate or restrict government speech. Without government speech,
the government could not function, debate and discussion of “issues of great
concern to the public” would be confined to the private sector, and the
process of government would be “radically transformed.” 10 Without
government speech, the public would have no understanding of what the
government seeks to accomplish and why; and, in order to preserve the
government’s right to engage in speech, the First Amendment cannot limit
government speech.11 Otherwise, the government could be restrained by a
“First Amendment heckler” from expressing its views, and thereby prevented
from informing society about the policies it seeks to adopt or opposes and
indeed how it governs.12 In other words, in the absence of protected
government speech, the government cannot govern.13
The Court then concluded that Pleasant Grove City engaged in
government speech when it displayed permanent monuments on public
property.14 Several factors were considered in reaching this conclusion. First,
governments have historically displayed monuments to commemorate
important events, convey a message, or instill feelings in those who view the
8

Summan, 555 U.S. at 465-66.
Id. at 472, 481.
10
Id. at 467-68.
11
Id. at 468.
12
Id.
13
Id. (“Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could function if it lacked this
freedom.”).
14
Id. at 470, 472.
9
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monument.15 Second, individuals who observe the monument normally
associate the meaning conveyed by the monument with property owner on
which the monument is displayed.16 Third, the City maintained control over
the message conveyed by the monuments by exercising final authority in
their selection and selecting only those monuments which presented the
image the City wanted to project.17 Fourth, the City took ownership of the
monuments and placed them in a park it owns and manages, thereby
signifying the monument speaks on its behalf.18 Finally, the permanent nature
of donated monuments and the finite amount of space in a public park
preclude the application of public forum analysis. More particularly, if public
forum analysis is applied to public monuments, Pleasant Grove City would
be forced to accept and display all donated monuments, or to refuse to accept
any donated monuments and remove monuments already on display to avoid
exercising viewpoint discrimination. When public forum analysis eliminates
the forum, it is obviously out of place.19 Notably, then, even though the
monuments were displayed in a public park, the Court decided public forum
analysis was inapplicable.20 Hence, the Court concluded, Pleasant Grove
City’s acceptance of privately donated monuments is government speech
which is not subject to the First Amendment restrictions.21

III. WALKER MAJORITY OPINION: LICENSE PLATES CONVEY
GOVERNMENT SPEECH
In the majority opinion in Walker, the Court employed the first four of
the five factors identified above to buttress its conclusion specialty license
plates convey government speech.22 First, the Court noted, states have
15

Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
17
Id. at 473.
18
Id. at 474, 476.
19
Id. at 480.
20
Id. at 478.
21
Id. at 481.
22
The four factors cited in determining specialty license plates are government speech conveyance of a state message on the license plate, identification of the license plate with the
state, final state approval of the license plate design before issuance, and transmitting the
stamp of government approval - echo the significant constitutional disputes triggered by the
State Department’s refusal to issue passports, unilateral revocation of passports, or imposition
of geographic limitations on travel. Hopefully this will provide an interesting topic for a future
research project. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144
(1958); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); and United
States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967). See also Thomas E. Laursen, Constitutional Protection of
Foreign Travel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 902 (1981); The Right to Travel, 95 HARV. L. REV. 201
(1981); Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271 (2008);
16
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historically employed license plates to convey messages beyond the state
name and vehicle identification number. The additional messages include:
depictions of the head of a Hereford steer (Arizona), a codfish
(Massachusetts), a bucking bronco (Colorado) and a potato (Idaho); and
slogans such as “Idaho Potatoes,” “North to the Future” (Alaska), “Keep
Florida Green,” “Hoosier Hospitality,” “Green Mountains” (Vermont), and
“America’s Dairyland” (Wisconsin).23 Texas, too, communicated various
messages on its license plates, including: “Hemisfair 68” (to promote a San
Antonio event); a small silhouette of the State; and “150 years of Statehood.”
The Texas Legislature also authorized various slogans on license plates:
“Read to Succeed,” “Houston Livestock Show and Rodeo,” Texans Conquer
Cancer,” and “Girl Scouts.”
Second, Texas license plates are closely identified with the State of
Texas. Not only do they serve the governmental purpose of registering and
identifying vehicles, but they are issued by the State and each license
contains the name “Texas” in large letters at the top. People who design and
obtain approval of specialty license plates likely intend to convey the
message of state approval. Otherwise, bumper stickers would suffice. People
who view Texas license plates easily identify them with the State, and
believe messages on the specialty license plates have been endorsed by Texas
through its approval process.
Third, Texas directly and exclusively controls the messages appearing
on its specialty license plates through the approval process, thereby reserving
for itself final approval authority over what messages it wants conveyed to
the public. It can celebrate educational institutions attended by its citizens,
but can reject slogans deriding schooling. It can pay tribute to Texas’ citrus
industry, but need not tout Florida’s oranges. It can offer plates saying “Fight
Terrorism,” but can refuse to promote al Qaeda.24
Fourth, the messages conveyed on specialty license plates not only have
been approved by the Board, but appear directly below the large letters
identifying “Texas” as the issuer of the plates. The approved designs “are
meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message,
and they thus constitute government speech,” thereby making forum analysis
misplaced and First Amendment restrictions inapplicable.25
The Court conceded the fifth factor was inapplicable. While a park can
hold only a finite number of monuments, the Board can theoretically approve
Jeffrey Kahn, The Extraordinary Mrs. Shipley: How the United States Controlled
International Travel Before the Age of Terrorism, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 819 (2011); and Ramzi
Kasseem, Passport Revocation as Proxy Denaturalization: Examining the Yemen Cases, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2099 (2014).
23
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2248.
24
Id. at 2249.
25
Id. at 2250.
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as many license plate designs as are submitted and need not make them
available forever. Nonetheless, the Court reasoned the public forum analysis
was inapplicable, because “license plates are not traditional public forums for
private speech.”26

IV. WALKER DISSENTING OPINION: LICENSE PLATES ARE LIMITED
PUBLIC FORUMS
The dissenting opinion in Walker immediately takes issue with the
classification of specialty license plates as government speech, asking the
reader to imagine she is sitting on the side of the road watching the license
plates speed by. Would the reader honestly believe the license plate that says
“Rather be Golfing” conveys official state policy or means Texas is
promoting golf over tennis or bowling? That permitting the names Notre
Dame, Oklahoma State, University of Oklahoma, Kansas State and Iowa
State to appear on license plates meant Texas was officially rooting, not for
the Texas Longhorns, but for the other team?27 The dissent insists that
placing these messages under the umbrella of government speech creates a
dangerous precedent that “takes a large and painful bite out of the First
Amendment.”28 It strips away all constitutional protection of whatever
message the motorist has paid a premium to place on the license plate, and
permits the state to engage in viewpoint discrimination when it approves
some but rejects other specialty license plates.29
The dissent characterizes specialty license plates as small, mobile
billboards, a portion of which can be used by the vehicle’s owner to display a
selected message, provided that message is preliminarily approved by the
Board. The dissent asks the reader to imagine the state or a state university
erecting a large, stationery, electronic billboard, some space on which can be
rented by individuals who want to post a message, and renting that space
only if the state found the message to be sufficiently noncontroversial or
consistent with prevailing state or university views. No one could doubt, the
dissent insists, that such a scenario involved blatant viewpoint discrimination
which violates the First Amendment.30
The dissent also notes that the “contrast between the history of public
monuments . . . and the Texas license plate program could not be starker.”31
Governments have accepted and displayed of monuments for centuries;
26

Id. at 2551.
Id. at 2255.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 2255-56.
30
Id. at 2256.
31
Id. at 2260.
27
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private party sponsorship of specialty license plates is comparatively quite
new. The display of permanent monuments is limited by available space;
specialty license plates have no limits beyond their sponsors. Government
selects the monument to be displayed; the Board, attentive to the need to
enhance state revenues, encourages sponsors to submit designs and routinely
approves them. Monuments convey the message the government seeks to
communicate; specialty license plates convey sponsor created messages, not
messages the government supports.32 That sponsors’ desire to obtain the
state’s “seal of approval” of their messages transforms the message to
government speech is “dangerous reasoning,” because it ignores the huge
difference between speech the government employs to further its programs
and speech of private parties to which the government attaches its blessing or
condemnation.33
The dissent concludes that selling space for messages on specialty
license plates creates a limited public forum, because Texas permits state
property (motor vehicle licenses) to be used by private speakers to convey
their messages consistent with the rules of its approval process. Those rules,
however, cannot permit viewpoint discrimination, and denying approval to
SCV’s confederate flag design because it may be offensive to others is “pure
viewpoint discrimination.”34

V. SIGNIFICANCE OF WALKER
The assessment of Walker by legal scholars has been limited. Helen
Norton, Professor of Law at the University of Colorado School of Law,
criticizes Walker, because the Court “again missed an important opportunity
to clarify and refine its government speech doctrine to require that the
government make clear when it is speaking before it can assert the
government speech defense to Free Speech challenges.”35 David A.
Anderson, the Fred and Emily Marshall Wulff Centennial Chair in Law at the
University of Texas School of Law, criticizes Walker, because it insists there
is a binary division between private and government speech, and ignores the
growing phenomenon of the public/private partnerships in which (1) private
sector companies run state prisons and public hospitals, fund university
research, and manage public schools, (2) public/private partners develop
sports facilities and office buildings, (3) the roles of private security officers
and public officers intermingle and overlap, and (4) private companies are
32

Id. at 2260-62.
Id. at 2261.
34
Id. at 2262.
35
Helen Norton, Government Speech and Political Courage, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 62
(2015).
33
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given powers of eminent domain. These public/private partnerships extend
and blur the realm of speech, permitting government to promote beef, grapes,
apples and citrus fruits, advertise soft drinks on university stadium
scoreboards, and license the city of Dallas logo to promote the sales of
insurance. Not addressing the public/private phenomenon the case overlooks
“an opportunity to look for a more cogent way to deal with the privatization
boom.”36
The immediate impact of Walker is to give “significant leeway to states
to issue or deny specialty plates as they see fit,”37 and avoid legal skirmishes
over whether to permit a confederate flag or Nazi swastika, right-to-life or
pro-choice sentiments, gun rights or gun control advocacy, or promotions of
controversial enterprises (tobacco and mining), sports (fox hunting), or team
names (Washington Redskins) on specialty license plates.38
The broader implication of Walker is whether or not government control
over application procedures might permit the government “to censor a
broader range of private speech simply by claiming some level of
governmental involvement.”39 This is demonstrated in part by six subsequent
decisions that have substantively discussed Walker. Four of those decisions
concluded government speech trumps First Amendment claims. Two did not.

36

David A. Anderson, Of Horses, Donkey, and Mules, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2015)
David L. Hudson, Jr., October 2014 Term: First Amendment Review, 42 ABA PREVIEW 281,
282 (2015). See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 2015 W.L 4662435 at 1, 4
(W.D. Va. 2015) (vacating the district court’s prior order enjoining the enforcement of that
portion of the Virginia Code which banned the placement of the Sons of Confederate Veterans
logo containing the Confederate flat on license plates).
38
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2262. See
Holcomb, 2015 WL 4662435 at 4:
37

When the Supreme Court speaks, district courts must listen. In light of the ruling in
Walker, the primary rationale for the 2001 judgment and injunction in this case is no
longer good law. Specialty license plates represent the government's speech, and the
Commonwealth may choose, consonant with the First Amendment, the message it
wishes to convey on those plates. The Commonwealth's rationale for singling out SCV
for different treatment is no longer relevant. According to the Supreme Court, the
Commonwealth is free to treat SCV differently from all other specialty groups. Because
the underlying injunction violates that right, I have no choice but to dissolve it.
Because Texas does not require its specialty license holders to adopt an approved license
design, Walker likely does not face a challenge on the grounds of compelled speech. See
Cressman v. Thompson, 798 F.3d 938, 956-958 (10th Cir. 2015) (while requiring license
holders to display the image of a Native American Indian crouched down and shooting an
arrow into the clouds may constitute compelled speech, the license holder ”explicitly
indicated” the image was not personally objectionable to him). Cressman is discussed more
fully below in this article.
39

Hudson supra note 32, at 282.
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In Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse,40 the federal district court ruled that
the federal trademark registration program is government speech and
therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.41 Amanda Blackhorse and
four other individuals (“Defendants”) filed a petition with the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel the six registrations of the logo of
the Washington Redskins professional football team owned by Pro-Football,
Inc. Finding that the marks “may disparage a substantial composite of Native
Americans and bring them into contempt or disrepute,” TTAB scheduled the
cancellation of the registered marks under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.
The parties then sought a de nova review of TTAB’s decision in the federal
district court based on the record before TTAB and additional evidence the
parties submitted. Pro-Football, Inc. claimed, among other things, that
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violated the First Amendment.42
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants
denying Pro-Football’s First Amendment claim, because: (1) cancelling the
registrations of the Redskins marks under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
does not burden, restrict, or prohibit Pro-Football, Inc.’s ability to use the
marks, and does not restrict any expression,43 and (2) the federal trademark
registration program is government speech exempt from First Amendment
protection.44 The basis of the latter decision was Walker. The district court
found that the federal trademark registration program communicates the
message the federal government has approved the trademark,” and that “the
public closely associates federal trademark registration with the federal
government.” “[T]he insignia for federal trademark registration, ®, is a
manifestation of the federal government’s recognition of the mark,” and “the
federal government exercises editorial control over the federal trademark
registration program.” Further, Section 2(a) “empowers the PTO to deny or
cancel a mark’s registration, and thus control what appears on the Principal
Register.”45 Because the Walker factors demonstrated the trademark
registration program is government speech,” it is exempt from First
Amendment scrutiny and Pro-Football’s First Amendment claim must fail.46
40

112 F. Supp.3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), appeal docketed, No 15-1874 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015).
Id. at 8, 11, and 12.
42
Id. at 2-4.
43
Id. at 9.
44
Id. at 8.
45
Id. at 12.
46
Id. at 17. Contra In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1335-1336, 1346-1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015), (en
banc) (the refusal of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to register the trademark
“The Slants” for a musical band on the grounds the mark was disparaging to people of Asian
descent is a content-based restriction which cannot survive strict scrutiny, and the issuance of
a trademark registration by TTAB is not government speech). The Federal Circuit Court
decision makes it likely the U.S. Supreme Court will review whether trademark registration is
government speech. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Ban on disparaging trademarks violates First
41
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In United Veterans Memorial and Patriotic Ass’n of the City of New
Rochelle v. City of New Rochelle,47 Plaintiffs, United Veterans Memorial and
Patriotic Association of the City of New Rochelle (“United Veterans”) and
Peter Parente, objected to City Council’s decision to remove the “Gadsden
Flag” from a flagpole on the New Rochelle armory.48 The flag had flown
below the American flag, which had become tattered and worn. When the
American flag was replaced, the Gadsden Flag was removed. A subsequent
motion to restore the Gadsden Flag made at a City Council meeting was
defeated by a vote of 5-2, and Plaintiffs claimed the removal of the flag
violates their First Amendment rights.49 The District Court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.50 On
appeal, the Second Circuit ruled the display of flags on the City of New
Rochelle’s Amory constituted government speech under Walker. When the
Armory was deeded to the City of New Rochelle, the deed required that the
property remain open for public use for recreation, park, highway and street
purposes. While the City of New Rochelle delegated the selection of flags to
the United Veterans, the display of flags constituted government speech,
which did not implicate the First Amendment. Displaying and maintaining
flags on its flagpole did not create a public forum or diminish the control of
the flags displayed. The flagpole was owned by the government and located
in a public space used for recreational purposes, and a reasonable observer
would believe the flags conveyed a message of the City of New Rochelle.51
Once again, then, government speech trumped a First Amendment claim.
In American Freedom Defense Initiative v. King County,52 the King
County’s public transit agency (“Metro”), which operates an extensive public
transportation system in the Seattle metropolitan area, rejected an
advertisement submitted by Plaintiff, American Freedom Defense Initiative

Amendment, Federal Circuit rules in band’s appeal, ABA TECH MONTHLY (Dec. 23, 2015,
9:35 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ban_on_disparaging_trademarks_violates_first_amen
dment_en_banc_federal_circ/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=te
ch_monthly.
47
72 F.Supp.3d 468 (S.D. N.Y. 2014).
48
Id. at 471. The Gadsden Flag is historically important. It is named after Christopher
Gadsden, who gave it to the Continental Navy in 1775. It is yellow and depicts a coiled
rattlesnake above the words “Don’t Tread on Me.” Plaintiffs contend the flag honors
represents the Nation’s proud history and strength, and honors the sacrifices of Navy and
Marine veterans who served under the Gadsden Flag throughout the nation’s history.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 478.
51
Veterans Mem’l and Patriotic Ass’n of the City of New Rochelle v. City of New Rochelle,
615 Fed. Appx. 693 (2d Cir. 2015).
52
796 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2015).

Spring 2017 Schoen/45

(AFDI), because the ad failed to meet its guidelines.53 Metro’s 2012
advertising policy, which was in effect when Metro rejected Plaintiff’s ad,
generally accepts advertisements unless they fall into eleven categories.54 In
2013, Metro had approved an ad submitted by the United States Department
of State, which contained the names and photos of 16 individuals under the
caption “Faces of Global Terrorism” and stated: “Stop a Terrorist. Save lives.
Up to $25 Million Reward.”55 After the ad appeared on the bus exteriors,
Metro received complaints from the public, including a member of Congress
and two community leaders, who claimed the ad was offensive and would
foment mistreatment of racial, ethnic and religious minorities, who had
similar appearances or names to the persons shown in the ad. Metro initiated
a review of its advertising criteria, and the State Department voluntarily
retracted the ad.56
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a substantially similar ad to
Metro, containing the same names, photos and caption, with the following
statements: “AFDI Wants You to Stop a Terrorist” and “The FBI is Offering
Up to $25 Million Reward If You Help Capture One of These Jihadis.”57
Metro concluded the AFDI’s advertisement did not comply with its
advertising criteria and declined to display Plaintiff’s ad on Metro’s buses.58
Rather than discussing the rejection of the ad with Metro, Plaintiff filed an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending its First Amendment rights were
violated and seeking an injunction ordering Metro to publish its ad.59
The Ninth Circuit determined that Metro did not intend to create a
public forum in accepting advertisements on its buses, but rather created a
nonpublic forum, because it employed a prescreening process to review
submitted ads, rejected a range of proposed ads including other public-issue
ads, and placed the ads on the buses whose primary purpose is to provide
public transportation. The Ninth Circuit noted that this conclusion was
confirmed by Walker, which held the exercise of final authority over content
“mitigates against the determination Texas created a public forum” on its
license plates.60 Having created a nonpublic forum, Metro’s rejection of
53

Id. at 1167.
Id. Metro’s 2012 advertising policy generally accepted advertisements unless they fell into
eleven categories: (1) “political campaign speech”; (2) “tobacco, alcohol, firearms and adultrelated products and services”; (3) “sexual or excretory subject matter”; (4) “false or
misleading”; (5) “copyright, trademark, or otherwise unlawful”; (6) illegal activity”; (7)
“profanity and violence”’ (8) “demeaning or disparaging”; (9) “harmful or disruptive to transit
system”; (10) “lights, noise, and special effects”; and (11) “unsafe transit behavior.”
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 1168.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1170.
54
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Plaintiff’s ad must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.61 Both criteria were
satisfied, the Tenth Circuit decided, because the ad was false and misleading
(the Department of State, not the FBI, offered the rewards), and there was no
evidence in the record suggesting “Metro would have accepted the ad with
the same inaccuracy if only the ad has expressed a different viewpoint or that
Metro had accepted other ads containing false statements.”62
In Mech v. School Board of Palm Beach County,63 the School Board
overseeing the Palm Beach County School District permitted schools to hang
banners on their fences recognizing sponsors of school programs as “Partners
in Excellence.”64 The banners were subject to several conditions. The
principal of each school was required to select and approve business partners
that were consistent with the school district’s educational mission and
community values. The banners, visible from the road, had to be a “uniform
size, color and font” and express gratitude to the sponsor; the banners listed
the name, phone number, web address and logo of the business partner, but
could not include a photograph or large logo.65 Three schools in the district
displayed banners acknowledging David Mech, who offered math tutoring
services under the name “The Happy/Fun Math Tutor.” Mech also happened
to be a retired porn star, who had performed in hundreds of pornographic
films, and who owns Dave Pounder Productions LLC, a company that
formerly produced pornography. Both the Happy/Fun Math Tutor and Dave
Pounder Productions share a mailing address in Boca Raton, Florida. When
several parents discovered the common ownership of The Happy/Fun Math
Tutor and Dave Pounder Productions and complained about Mech’s banners,
the schools removed the banners on the grounds the connection between the
two enterprises was inconsistent with the schools’ educational mission and
community values.66 Mech sued the School Board for violating his First
Amendment rights. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the
district court determined the removal of the banner did not abridge the First
Amendment and ruled in favor of the School Board. Mech appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit.67

61

Id.
Id. at 1171. Contra Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 70 F.Supp.3d 572
(S.D. N.Y. 2015). Unlike the license plates in Walker, advertising space on New York City
Metropolitan Transportation Authority buses was a public forum, because that space is
traditionally available for private speech and there was no indication that the speech was
owned or conveyed by the government. Id. at n. 4.
63
806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015).
64
Id. at 1 and 2.
65
Id. at 2.
66
Id.
67
Id.
62
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The Court of Appeals decided that the removal of Mech’s banners from
the schools did not violate the First Amendment, because under Walker the
decision to do was government speech.68 The Court considered the three
factors applied in Walker in making its determination: history, endorsement
and control. Because there was little or no evidence in the record detailing
the history of the school banner program beyond its being launched in 2008,
the Court, cautioning that “a long historical pedigree is not a prerequisite for
government speech,” concluded the first factor weighed in Mech’s favor. The
second factor – government endorsement of the message conveyed by the
banner – squarely suggested the banners were government speech. The
banners were hung on school fences, and the public closely identifies
messages appearing on school district property with the school district.
Further the banner contains the school’s initials, is printed in the school’s
colors, and identifies the sponsor as a “Partner in Excellence” with the
school, clearly conveying the message that the sponsor has a close
relationship and works with the school.69 Further, Mech’s banner, promoting
tutoring services in math, containing the schools initials and colors, and
labeling the Happy/Fun Math Tutor as a partner in excellence, creates the
clear impression the school endorsed the tutoring services.70 The third factor
– control over the message – “strongly suggests” the banners are government
speech.71 The schools dictate: the design, typeface and color of the banners;
the information contained in the banner; the banner size and location; and the
inclusion of the school’s initials and the Partner in Excellence message.
Further the school’s principal exercises final approval of the banner before it
is displayed. In short, the “message set out in [a banner] is from beginning to
end the message established by the school.”72 Because the display of the
Happy/Fun Math Tutor is government speech, Mech’s First Amendment
must fail. Hence, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court.73
As noted above, two other decisions, which also substantively discussed
Walker, declined to extend the reach of government speech. In Cressman v.
Thompson.74 a motorist objected to the depiction of a Native American
shooting an arrow toward the sky on Oklahoma state vehicle license plates,
claiming the display of the license plate on his car compelled him to
communicate a pantheistic message which was contrary to his religious
68
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beliefs.75 The Tenth Circuit ruled that even though the display of the drawing
on the license plate conveyed a government message and qualified as
government speech under Walker,76 it nonetheless could still implicate the
First Amendment rights of individuals objecting to the message. The Court
noted that “the affixation of objectionable speech on a standard license plate
implicates compelled speech concerns if it forces a vehicle owner . . . [to
foster] a point of view he finds unacceptable.”77 The Court then discussed the
nature of the drawing appearing on the license plate, and concluded it was
symbolic speech, which an objective observer would interpret as conveying
the message that Oklahoma’s history and culture was strongly influenced by
Native Americans.78 This message was not one to which Cressman objected.
Rather he objected to the religious message conveyed by the drawing.
Because he did not object to the message a reasonable observer would
receive from the drawing, Cressman was not compelled to utter a view he
opposed and could not succeed in his compelled speech claim.79
Likewise, in Rideout v. Gardner,80 voters challenged a New Hampshire
statute prohibiting them from disclosing or displaying a digital or
photographic copy of their completed ballots.81 The voters claimed the law
violated their right of political expression, because it prohibited them from
posting copies of their completed ballots in social media.82 The Secretary of
State defended the statute by arguing that, under Walker, “completed ballots
are a form of government speech and thus do not trigger First Amendment
protection at all.83 The district court quickly dismissed this argument,
because (1) ballots do not communicate a state message, but merely list the
slate of candidates; (2) there is no possibility a voter’s marking on the ballot
75
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will be interpreted as state speech; and (3) the state does not control the
messages people convey on ballots beyond requiring they place no
distinguishing mark on their ballot.84 Hence the markings voters place on
their ballots do not constitute government speech.85 The Secretary of State
also maintained that the principal purpose of the law was to prevent vote
buying and voter coercion.86 The district court determined that prohibiting
the display of completed ballots was a content-based restriction that must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny.87 Because the government produced no
evidence showing that “the state has an actual or imminent problem with
images of completed ballots being used to facilitate either vote buying or
voter coercion” or even “a single instance anywhere in the United States . . .
that digital or photographic images of completed ballots have been used to
facilitate vote buying or voter coercion,” it failed to demonstrate the law
serves a compelling state interest and hence flunks strict scrutiny.88
The limited number of post-Walker decisions restricts an assessment of
whether Walker has extended the reach of government speech. Pro-Football,
Inc. lost the registered status of its six Washington Redskins trademarks
(though not the use of those trademarks), because the TTAB controls the
application process for approval of trademarks and makes the ultimate
regulatory decision on granting or denying the extension of trademark
applications. The City of New Rochelle, the grantee of the City’s Amory,
required to hold the property for public use, retained ultimate authority to
determine what flags would be displayed on its flagpoles on the Amory
property. The King’s County public transit agency was not required to accept
the advertising message of AFDI, because the transit agency employed an
approval procedure for submitted advertisements and retained control over
which ads would be affixed to its buses. Schools within the Palm Beach
County School District exercised government speech when they displayed
(and removed) banners expressing gratitude for the assistance of sponsors of
school programs and designated those sponsors as “Partners in Excellence.”
On the other hand, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the authority of
Oklahoma to approve the design and insignia on its license plates did not
preclude a First Amendment claim of compelled speech, and a federal district
court has ruled that New Hampshire’s prohibition against displaying a copy
of a completed election ballot violated the First Amendment, because it
prevented voters from engaging in political expression by publicizing their
completed ballots on social media.
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VI. SUMMARY
Walker makes an interesting addition to the government speech terrain.
The majority opinion, relying heavily on Summum, determined that a
specialty state license plate constitutes government speech not subject to
First Amendment restrictions, because states convey messages on license
plates, are closely identified with license plates, exercise final approval of the
license plate design, and convey the stamp of state approval. Hence similar
government message approval processes, such as registering a trademark,
deciding what flags may fly on public property, approving advertisements on
public transit vehicles, and placing banners on school fences expressing
gratitude to their “Partners in Excellence” constitute government speech
which is not restricted by the First Amendment. It will be very interesting to
learn where the Summum/Walker factors will coalesce in the future to expand
the government speech terrain.
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